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Visual Confidences and Direct Perceptual Justification1 
 
Abstract: What kind of content must visual states have if they are to 
offer direct (non-inferential) justification for our external world 
beliefs? How must they present that content if the degree of 
justification they provide is to reflect the nuance of our changing 
visual experiences? This paper offers an argument for the view that 
visual states comprise not only a content, but a confidence relation 
to that content. That confidence relation explains how visual states 
can offer direct perceptual justification of differing degrees for 
external world beliefs. These confidence relations allow that visual 
states justify beliefs in a way that is sensitive to subtle differences 
in the character of our visual experiences, whilst still allowing that 
visual states give us non-inferential access to the external world in 
virtue of their content.  
 
Visual states justify beliefs. My belief that there is a turtle on the beach is 
justified by a visual experience that represents a turtle. But not all 
experiences that represent a turtle are created equal: whilst some offer 
excellent justification for belief, others offer only weak justification, as 
when the turtle is seen at a distance. Although far and near experiences 
may both represent a turtle on the beach, the particular appearance of the 
turtle in each instance varies. And that variation has important 
ramifications for the capacity of the experience to justify belief. An 
adequate account of perceptual justification must be capable of 
accommodating and explaining that variation. It must link the way the 
world appears, to the justification our perceptual beliefs enjoy.  
 How are we to explain this variation in perceptual justification? 
What properties must our experience have if it is to account for these 
fluctuations in epistemic power, even across experiences that share 
epistemically relevant contents? I propose that we should understand the 
relevant difference in such cases as a change in the certainty or confidence 
with which the visual state presents its content. Doing so allows that direct 
visual justification for beliefs about the external world can come in degrees 
that reflect subtle but epistemically relevant shifts in phenomenology.  
 In section one I use two cases to focus our attention on the question 
in hand: what feature of visual states explains how they can offer 
justification of different degrees to belief? In section two I suggest that 
these cases reveal a tension between four intuitive principles in perceptual 
epistemology. In section three I survey possible avenues of responses to 																																																								
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that tension. I suggest that the source of the tension is the assumption that 
visual states are not graded. In section four I describe an alternative view, 
according to which visual states too come in degrees. Section five offers an 
explanation of how graded visual confidences can account for the degree of 
justification visual perceptual states confer on beliefs, including graded 
belief states. Section six uses visual confidences to explain how visual 
experience can offer us direct justification for more complex beliefs, 
including comparative and disjunctive beliefs. 
In what follows I shall focus on visual experiences. The argument 
may generalize to perceptual experience and perceptual justification more 
broadly. Since I think it important we leave open the possibility that there 
may be important discontinuities between visual justification and 
perceptual justification via other sensory modalities, I will talk in terms 
specific to vision.  
 
1. Elmer and the Fog 
 
The phenomenal character of a visual experience can change incrementally. 
How things look to you develops gradually as you move, as the scene you 
are looking at evolves, or as environmental conditions change. Those 
changes in phenomenal appearance have epistemic upshots: your 
epistemic position also changes very gradually, in line with them.  
It is natural to think the epistemic power of an experience depends 
at least in part on its content:2 whether or not a given experience can justify 
a belief depends on whether the experience has the appropriate content. 
This raises the following question: what form must the content of 
experience take, or how must it be presented, such that it can reflect these 
subtle changes in appearance, and their impact on the justification we have 
for belief?  
 
Consider the following cases:  
 
Fog: Elmer is sitting inside a house while the fog clears 
outside. At some point he will get up and look out of the 
window at a tree which stands outside. He could have a 
range of visual experiences, depending on the point at 
which he looks out the window. If he goes to the 
window soon the tree will be wholly obscured by fog. If 
he waits an hour, he will have a perfectly clear 																																																								
2 This paper engages with a tradition that assumes experiences have 
representational, truth-evaluable contents. For recent denials of this claim see 
Travis 2004, Brewer 2006. 
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experience of the tree. In between those times there is a 
continuum of available experiences, from very-foggy to 
no-fog-at-all.  
 
Turn: Rey is in the process of turning her head. As she 
turns her head, a medium-sized grey box will come into 
her view. First she sees the box only out of the corner of 
her eye. As she continues to turn, her visual experience of 
the box becomes clearer. By the time she has completed 
the movement she will be looking straight at the box.  
 
What do we want to say in these cases? If Elmer looks out of the window in 
an hour’s time, once the fog has cleared, his visual experience is well 
placed to offer him direct justification for the belief that there is a tree 
outside the window, just as Rey’s experience once she has completed the 
turn may directly justify the belief that there is a large grey box some 
particular distance in front of her. Intuitively, Elmer and Rey’s epistemic 
positions change gradually. If Elmer goes to the window now, he will 
enjoy weak justification for the belief that there is a tree outside. And if he 
goes to the window in an hour, he will enjoy excellent justification for the 
same belief. But the change between those points is incremental: any small 
change in the amount of fog should not make a big difference to the degree 
of justification he has for a tree belief. Rather, the epistemic change 
between points is gradual, just as the change in the appearance of the tree 
is gradual.  
 These cases focus our attention on the visual states responsible for 
the justification of the relevant beliefs. What properties of those states 
could explain this subtle variation in degree of justification? How do those 
states change as the fog clears? And at what points can Elmer or Rey 
receive direct justification for their beliefs?   
We could ask the same question not in terms of degree of 
justification but in terms of degree of belief. Rey should be more confident 
in her beliefs about the box’s location when she is looking straight at it, 
than when she sees it from the corner of her eye. As she turns her head, the 
confidence her experience is capable of justifying gradually increases. What 
feature of the visual experiences Rey has explains the change in the 
confidence she is entitled to have in the location of the object? And which 
of those confidences is directly justified by her experience?  
 Note that at some level the contents of Rey and Elmer’s experiences 
may remain the same, even as their phenomenal character changes in a 
way that is epistemically relevant. Suppose some of Elmer’s experiences 
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include tree content.3 Even when he sees the tree through some limited 
degree of fog, his experience may still include tree content. But it is 
consistent with this that as the fog becomes thicker, and as the character of 
Elmer’s experience changes to reflect that, the degree of justification his 
experience provides for a tree belief begins to wane. What is it about the 
visual state then that explains that variation in justification, if it isn’t the 
simple presence or absence of tree content?  
The kind of variation in perceptual appearance we are interested in 
is not confined to fog. Our visual experiences are richly nuanced. How an 
object looks to us depends on its distance from us, whether it is seen 
fleetingly or at an angle, the lighting conditions, and facts about our own 
visual system, such as whether we are wearing necessary corrective glasses 
or not. And yet a wide range of differently nuanced experiences may 
represent the same object. In this way, those factors may not be sufficient to 
change the epistemically relevant content of the experience – I may still 
have a visual experience that represents a glass a particular distance from 
me whether I see it clear eyed at the start of the evening, under the 
influence at the end of the evening, or blearily first thing in the morning. 
Despite their shared content (x is a glass), and the shared content of the 
beliefs they justify, those experiences provide different degrees of 
justification. That difference is tied to their phenomenology. What, then, 
are the epistemically relevant properties of visual states that explain that 
gradual change in degree of justification?  
 
 
2.  Principles 
 
I suggest that cases like those of Elmer and Rey reveal a tension between 
the following four principles.  
 
(1) Direct Visual Justification (External World): Some external 
world beliefs are directly justified by visual experience.  
 
(2) Content: a visual experience directly justifies belief in virtue of 
its contents. 
 
(3) Degree: Direct visual justification comes in degrees.  
 
(4) Binary: Visual states are not degreed. 																																																								
3 Note that these cases do not rely on the assumption that visual states include 
“high-level” content at the level of ordinary objects like trees or glasses.  See below 
in section three for an argument that they can arise even for low-level content.  
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I shall argue that we should abandon (4), accepting instead that visual 
states present their contents with varying degrees of confidence. I turn now 
to a discussion of each of these principles.  
 
What properties must visual states have if they are to offer direct yet 
degreed justification? This question starts from the basic and intuitive 
claim that visual experience gives us direct justification for beliefs about 
the external world.  
 
(1)  Direct Visual Justification (External World): Some external 
world beliefs are directly justified by visual experience.  
 
Direct justification is non-inferential. It stands in contrast thereby with 
indirect justification, when a visual experience justifies a belief in virtue of 
the good standing of additional inferential steps that intervene between the 
experience and the belief.  
Suppose you see a light on in the kitchen window as you arrive 
home. That could justify a belief that your partner is already home. But that 
justification is indirect. You infer from the visual experience of the light 
that your partner is home. When you have a visual experience of your 
partner at home, then your belief is a candidate for direct justification.4  
DVJ (ExW) underwrites foundationalist accounts of justification 
which claim that perceptual experience can offer a basic kind of 
justification for belief, one that allows us to begin the process of gathering 
the information which may then features in the inferences or interpretive 
priors that ground the justification of further beliefs. These accounts claim 
not just that perceptual experience justifies belief, but that it can provide 
immediate justification for belief, that is, justification that does not rely on 
the subject possessing justification for any other beliefs (Alston 1989, Audi 
1993, Pryor 2005, Huemer 2001, Feldman 2003).5   
The basic distinction between direct and indirect perceptual 
justification is this: some beliefs are justified because of a relation that 
holds directly between them and a visual experience. Other beliefs are 
																																																								
4 Siegel 2006 draws a related distinction between what is presented perceptually, 
and what we go on to believe. 
5 Direct justification by experience need not be immediate in this way. You could 
think that visual experience provides direct justification for certain beliefs only 
once other ancillary conditions are met, for instance, that the relevant perceptual 
process be sufficiently reliable (see Goldman 2006 for an example of such an 
account). It is possible that some beliefs are directly justified by experience even if 
none are immediately justified 
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justified in virtue of the good standing of further inferences that mediate 
between the experience and the beliefs that can be based upon it.  
DVJ(ExW) is a controversial view in perceptual epistemology, but it 
is an important one. It captures a simple and intuitive picture of how we 
come to learn about the external world: namely that we do so directly, via 
our sensory experience. This simplicity offers it a certain power: as a 
consequence the view can avoid certain skeptical arguments.6 According to 
dogmatist or phenomenal conservative views that entail DVJ (ExW), at 
least some of our beliefs enjoy prima facie justification on the basis of 
experience in a way that leaves them immune to the introduction of 
skeptical doubts about the good standing of our knowledge about the 
external world.7  In what follows I will not take DVJ (ExW) as settled, but I 
will assume that it represents an important and appealing position, one 
that is worth defending, if possible.  
 How do we circumscribe the set of beliefs which can be directly 
justified by visual experience? 8 In virtue of what does a visual experience 
directly justify a belief? It is natural to answer both those question in terms 
of relations between the contents of the two states. The set of beliefs 
capable of immediate justification by visual experience is the set of beliefs 
whose content is appropriately related to a visual experience. 9   
We can leave open at this stage what it takes for the content of a 
belief and an experience to be appropriately related. At its strongest once 
could think of the relation in terms of the uptake of visual contents by belief: 
there is an analogue of visual contents for belief, and a visual experience 
simply justifies the set of beliefs with the belief-analogue of its contents.10 
More loosely, we could think of belief as endorsing the content of 
experience,11 or of belief that is a “proper response” to an experience.12  
Common to these approaches is the insight that we explain the capacity of 																																																								
6 See Pace (2010) or McGrath (forthcoming) for this point. 
7 As for instance in Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001).  
8 Rescorla  (2014) terms this question the “demarcation problem”. He attributes the 
observation that dogmatist approaches to justification encounter it to Wright 
(2007).  
9 Note, though, that visual experience is not a prerequisite for direct justification, 
nor is the class of directly justified beliefs restricted to contentful beliefs. 
Introspective beliefs about one’s mental states or bodily sensations may be 
immediately justified by those states, even when those states fail to have any 
content, as is arguably the case with pain, for instance (Pryor 2005) 
10 This “uptake” picture is closely related to the content constraint critiqued in 
Silins (2011), according to which “[i]f your visual experience e gives you 
immediate justification to believe some external world proposition that p, then it is 
a phenomena content of e that p” (Silins 2011:335). 
11 See for instance Chalmers (2010), or Siegel (2013) for this usage.  
12 Richard Feldman (2003) draws on a notion of content closeness to develop an 
account of belief which is a “proper response” to experience. 
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an experience to directly justify some beliefs but not others in terms of its 
content.  
 
(2) Content: a visual experience directly justifies belief in virtue of 
its contents. 
 
The way in which direct visual justification relies on a relation 
between the contents of experience and belief limits the kinds of beliefs 
that can be directly justified by perceptual experience to those whose 
content is capable of standing in that appropriate relation to visual content. 
What sorts of contents experiences have therefore constrains which beliefs 
can be directly justified.13 Unless you think visual experience can include 
contents like “a successful and eccentric lothario,” it is unlikely that your 
belief that there’s a successful, eccentric lothario in front of you can be 
directly justified by a visual experience.14  You might instead gain visual 
justification for such a belief on the basis of inferences drawn from more 
basic beliefs, for instance about the individual’s appearance, beliefs which 
are directly justified by the visual experience. 
What properties and objects can feature in visual experiences is the 
subject of intense debate. Some will think that those contents are restricted 
to color, size and location properties. Others will be happy to include richer 
contents, including causation, agency or certain natural kind properties. 15 
If visual experiences include richer contents then they are capable of 
directly justifying a wider range of external world beliefs.  
 Note that a single visual experience may include a range of 
contents, not all which may be relevant to the justification it provides for a 
given belief. Suppose I have a visual experience of a red ball against a 
backdrop of mountains and sky. I form the belief “that’s a red ball”. 
Relative to this belief, the visual contents of the red ball is the operationally 
relevant content, since it is those contents which render the belief a good 
candidate for direct justification by the visual experience. The backdrop of 
mountains and sky, by contrast, are not.  
 So far so good: some external world beliefs are capable of being 
directly justified by visual experience, namely, those beliefs whose content 
is appropriately related to the content of a visual experience. But in 
addition to which beliefs we have justification for, our perceptual 																																																								
13 Siegel and Silins (2015) refer to this direction of constraint as the “reverse content 
constraint”. 
14 See also Richard Feldman (2003) for this point, made using the example of an 
eighty-four year old table.  
15 See for instance Siegel (2006), Bayne (2009), Hawley and MacPherson (2011), 
Brogaard (2013) for recent discussion of this question. 
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justification can vary along another axis: the degree of justification we have 
for a given belief. Sometimes, when things look one way to you but 
another to me, our experience may provide us with different degrees of 
justification for the same belief. You saw the turtle on the beach from right 
up close, so your belief that there’s a turtle on the beach is very strongly 
justified. I saw the turtle at a distance. I have justification for the same 
belief, but I have less or weaker justification.16  
 
(3) Degree: Visual justification comes in degrees. 
 
Degree is supported by the intuition that the visual justification we receive 
should be responsive to variations in how things look to us. If something 
looks one way to you, but another way to me, then you may have 
justification I lack, and vice versa. Those variations in our phenomenal 
experience explain why your belief is more strongly justified than mine. 
Since those phenomenal differences are subtle and degreed, justification 
too must be degreed if it is to capture them.  
This intuition in effect sets a desideratum on accounts of perceptual 
justification: they should allow that the justification visual experiences 
provide for belief reflects the changing nuance of our perceptual 
phenomenology. It’s natural to think both that phenomenal character 
constrains perceptual justification by limiting which beliefs you have 
justification for, and that it also plays a role in determining the degree of 
justification those beliefs enjoy. 
 
Desideratum: the justification a visual experience E offers for belief 
reflects the phenomenal character of E.17  																																																								
16 See Pautz 2011, and 2015 and Schellenberg 2015 for a more recent instance of the 
claim that perceptual justification comes in different degrees. Alvin Goldman 
makes a similar point in discussing process reliabilism: “Suppose Jones believes he 
has just seen a mountain-goat. Our assessment of the belief’s justifiedness is 
determined by whether he caught a brief glimpse of the creature at a great 
distance, or whether he had a good look at the thing only 30 yards away. His belief 
in the latter sort of case is (ceteris paribus) more justified that in the former sort of 
case…” (Goldman 1979:10).  17	One way of respecting that desideratum is via a principle connecting 
phenomenal character and phenomenal content. If phenomenal content grounds 
phenomenal character, for instance, such that any change in phenomenal character 
corresponds to a change in phenomenal contents, then as a result of Content, any 
change in phenomenal character corresponds to an epistemically relevant 
difference in an experience. Many representationalists endorse the claim that 
content grounds character in this way (Dretske (1995), Hill (2014), Schellenberg 
(2014), and Tye (1995)). That principle on its own, however, leaves unanswered the 
question of what the relevant change in contents is in these cases.			
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Experiential contents are stretched between different theoretical 
demands imposed by the principles above. On the one hand, DVJ (ExW), 
coupled with Content requires that the operationally relevant contents of 
experience be at a level that feature in our ordinary, external world beliefs. 
These beliefs are fairly thick grained: they feature objects and properties. 
On the other hand, in order to respect Degree, those operationally-relevant 
contents need to be sufficiently fine-grained that they are capable of 
accommodating the variation in visual justification introduced by subtle 
variations in the character of our experience. What properties must visual 
states have, if they are to directly justify external world beliefs, whilst 
allowing that that justification comes in differing degrees?  
It is often assumed that visual states are not degreed. There are two 
ways in which visual states could be degreed. On the one hand, the 
contents themselves could be degreed: visual content could be 
probabilistic, for instance. Alternatively, or in addition to this, visual states 
could include a degreed relation to their content. If neither of those 
possibilities hold, then visual states involve a binary relation to a binary 
content.18 On this picture, visual states are all-or-nothing. An experience 
includes an item among its contents, or it fails to do so. In this way, this 
assumption about visual states comes apart from what is increasingly 
becoming the standard model of belief, which allows that at least some 
belief states are graded. On these models of belief you do not simply 
believe or fail to believe a proposition. Instead you bear a graded 
confidence relation to a belief contents. By contrast, binary visual states do 
not come in degrees in either of the ways described above.19  
 
(4) Binary: Visual states are not degreed.  
 
These four principles are in tension with one another. To see this 
tension, return to the case of Elmer. On the one hand, we want to say that 
some of Elmer’s visual states can directly justify his tree belief. On the 
other hand we do not want to say those visual states offer the same degree 																																																								
18 It is sometimes said that visual representations can be indeterminate (Pautz 2011, 
Siegel  2006b , Block 2010). But as I argue below in section 3.5, unless that 
determinacy is degreed then it will not be able to provide the resources we need. I 
regard degreed indeterminacy as a close relation of the solution I myself propose. 
19 Recent work by John Morrison bucks this trend. Morrison argues in favor of a 
view he calls “perceptual confidence”, that “our perceptual experiences assign 
degrees of confidence” (forthcoming: 2). Sarah Moss (ms. section 4.3) also offers 
arguments in favor of the view that some perceptual experiences have what she 
describes as probabilistic contents.  
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of justification as one another for that belief. Assuming his visual states 
must be binary makes it hard for us to reconcile those desiderata. 
Suppose that visual experiences can include tree content, such that 
beliefs about trees can be directly justified by visual experience. At least 
some of Elmer’s experiences include tree content. Those experiences with 
tree content can directly justify tree beliefs in virtue of that content, in line 
with Content, and DVJ (ExW). The experience at the no-fog end of the 
spectrum couldn’t be any clearer, so if any experiences have tree content, 
this is a good candidate. Let’s call this experience Et1. The experience at the 
other end of the continuum has no tree content. Let’s call that experience 
Et∞.  
How far does the direct justification of tree beliefs reach down that 
continuum of experiences? Take an experience very shortly after Et1, Et2. 
This is distinguished from Et1 by a very tiny amount of fog. This quantity of 
fog is so slight it barely impacts on the phenomenal character of the 
experience. If Et1 includes tree content, then it is implausible that Et2 does 
not include it. If Et1 can directly justify a tree belief, then so can Et2.  
At some point in the chain of experiences, as the fog becomes 
thicker, the degree of justification Elmer’s experience provides for a tree 
belief begins to wane. If Elmer were to phone a suspicious friend to report 
his belief that there’s a tree outside the window, the suspicious friend 
might interrogate the conditions under which he saw it, to try and establish 
just how well justified Elmer’s belief is. And on hearing that he saw it 
through fog, he could reasonably judge that Elmer’s belief about the tree 
was not as well justified as if he’d seen it on a clear day.  
Direct justification by visual experience is grounded in visual 
contents. The kind of nuance in phenomenal character introduced by fog, 
or distance, or movement, or mildly defective occular hardware, may not 
be sufficient to change the operationally relevant content of the experience. 
I may still have a visual experience that represents a tree whether I see it 
through a little fog or on a sunny day. And according to Binary, those 
visual states do not come in degrees. So what, then, is the change in the 
visual state that means that the same belief is justified to a lesser degree, 
depending on the time at which Elmer walks to the window?  
 
This problem is only intensified when we pose it in terms of the 
justification of credal rather than binary belief states. The question 
becomes, what must visual states be like if they are to be capable of directly 
justifying different degrees of credence in a particular proposition? What 
explains why in some cases an experience entitles the subject to be highly 
confident in a given belief, and in others to have only a low confidence? Is 
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there a way of explaining that variation consistent with the claim that that 
entitlement is non-inferential?  
At the heart of all of these questions is the need for an account of 
how belief and experience interface with one another. It becomes 
increasingly hard to offer such an account, and hence to make sense of 
direct justification in virtue of experiential contents once we bring 
credences into the picture. Yet degrees of belief are an increasingly central 
way of modeling belief-states in both philosophy of mind and 
epistemology. It is natural to understand the contents of belief and 
perceptual states as structurally analogous to one another. This is 
motivated in part by the way in which the two seem capable of interacting 
with one another. But if belief comes in degrees, whilst perceptual states 
stand in a binary relation to their contents, how do they interface with one 
another? What facts about an experience fix the confidence a subject is 
entitled to have in beliefs in its contents?  
Perhaps we can sidestep this question by allowing that a believer is 
entitled to uptake the content of all visual experiences with credence one. A 
visual experience of a tree supports a belief with credence one that there is 
a tree at the relevant location. An experience of a tree shrouded in some 
degree of fog supports credence one in the belief that there is a tree in that 
location, shrouded in light fog. This approach supposes that we trust 
absolutely the determinate deliverances of our experience, and that those 
deliverances hence support the strongest credence.  
But there are good reasons to think that we don’t give credence one 
to the deliverances of our senses. Beliefs to which we give credence one are 
immune to revision. As rational actors we should be willing to accept any 
bet against them, however high the stake and however small the gain. That 
does not seem like a plausible description of our relationship with our 
sensory evidence. In fact, some have argued that it is implausible to think 
we give any empirical propositions credence one. 20 Direct justification is 
still defeasible justification. We frequently do revise our estimation of what 
we have seen, and just as often express our relationship with the evidence 
of our senses in uncertain or probabilistic terms. 
If we assign these propositions a confidence of less than one on the 
basis of a visual experience, what fixes the appropriate credence? Consider 
Richard Jeffrey’s example of an ambiguously colored cloth: “The agent 
inspects a piece of cloth by candlelight, and gets the impression that it is 
green, although he concedes that it might be blue or even (but very 
improbably) violet” (Jeffrey 1965:165). Jeffrey is concerned with the 																																																								
20 For discussion see Christensen 2004, or Frankish 2009. I set to one side the 
Williamsonian tradition which equates evidence and knowledge (Williamson 
2000).  
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difficulties this raises for Bayesian conditionalization, which assumes that 
the evidence on which we update is accorded a probability of one. Jeffrey 
conditionalization is a response to this. It allows that the evidence on 
which a subject updates need not have a probability of one. But this raises 
a prior question which has so far gone unanswered: what determines the 
probability that visual evidence receives? How does that evidence take a 
graded form, if the experiential state itself is binary? There is a mismatch 
between the form of the visual state and that of the belief-state that 
responds to it. 
These questions focus our attention on the nature of visual states 
and their content. Is there a way for visual states to offer justification for 




I turn now to surveying five possible responses. The first two allow visual 
experience to offer degreed justification by abandoning or restricting DVJ 
(ExW), the claim that visual experience directly justifies external world 
beliefs. The next two preserve DVJ (ExW) by offering an alternative set of 
operationally relevant contents. The intention of this section is not to offer a 
definitive dismissal of these possibilities, so much as to survey the 
available territory, and the costs associated with taking one or other route 
into it. The fifth option moves us towards the solution I endorse by 
querying the assumption that visual contents must be determinate. In the 
next section I go on to develop one particular version of this response, 
which gives up the claim that visual states are binary, allowing instead that 
they included graded confidence levels. This lets us capture the epistemic 
impact of subtle changes in our phenomenal experiences without 
demanding a retreat from the claim that visual experience can directly 
justify external world beliefs. 
 
 
i. Appearance properties 
One natural response to these sorts of cases is to think that we have 
misdescribed the sort of beliefs that can be directly justified by experience, 
in virtue of misidentifying the set of operationally relevant perceptual 
contents. According to this approach, the sort of properties that feature in 
visual experience and in virtue of which experience directly justifies belief 
are appearance properties. The beliefs they license are beliefs about how the 
world appears to us. From those beliefs about appearances we can then 
justifiably draw inferences about the external world. An object that looks 
like a cat is likely to be a cat. Differences in the strength of the inference 
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from the appearance property to the belief in question are responsible for 
the resultant degree of justification our external world beliefs enjoy. An 
inference that an object that looks like a cat is a cat is stronger than an 
inference that an object that looks like a cat is a Siamese cat, for instance. 
 On this account, Elmer enjoys direct justification on the basis of his 
experience for a set of beliefs about how the object in his visual field 
appears to him. His belief “that’s a tree” is justified in virtue of the good 
standing of the inferences he draws that an object with those appearance-
properties is likely to be a tree. As the fog gathers that inference from his 
appearance belief to his external world belief becomes increasingly tenuous 
and so the degree of justification he enjoys for it decreases.  
A similar retreat is open to us if we think that belief is degreed. We 
can treat the beliefs which are in receipt of justification as introspective 
beliefs about experience, which then receive credence one. Though I may be 
unsure of the color of the cloth, I can be sure that the cloth looks this way to 
me. Coupled with relevant background information, that belief about how 
things seem to me can in turn justify an appropriate credence in the belief 
that the cloth is blue or purple. I can then update the rest of my beliefs 
accordingly.  
 This style of response constitutes a retreat from DVJ (ExW) to a 
weaker form of the claim that visual experience offers direct justification 
for belief. That weaker claim is  
 
DVJ (Internal World): Only beliefs about one’s own experience are 
directly justified by visual experience,  
 
We observed above that DVJ (ExW) is attractive in part because of the role 
that it plays in supporting accounts according to which visual experience 
offers a foundational kind of grounding for belief. We can distinguish 
between two kinds of foundationalism, “classical foundationalism” and 
“modest foundationalism”.21 Classical foundationalism allows that only 
beliefs about the character of one’s own experiences are foundationally 
justified. Modest foundationalism allows that beliefs about the external 
world can enjoy foundational justification. In retreating from DVJ (ExW)  to 
DVJ (IntW) this response to cases like those of Rey and Elmer in effect 
throws in the towel on a certain epistemological project, one which, in line 
with modest foundationalism, has ambitions to establish that our 
perceptual experiences put us in contact with the external world directly.22 																																																								
21 See Pace (2010) and McGrath (forthcoming) for this distinction. 
22 Though see McGrath (forthcoming) for a view on which visual experience 
directly justifies “looks propositions”, but according to which those propositions 
are external world propositions	
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Those ambitions in turn offer these accounts the resources to oppose 
skeptical arguments that intervene on the inferential step between 
appearance and external world beliefs. Whilst acknowledging that 
retreating to appearance properties offers one potential avenue of response 
to these cases, it is worth continuing to look for responses to these cases 
that let us preserve DVJ (ExW).  
 
ii. Very few beliefs are directly justified by visual experience 
Another possible response to the tension described above claims that only 
the very clearest experiences have tree content of the kind that can directly 
justify tree beliefs. After that, Elmer’s beliefs are justified indirectly. For 
instance, a belief that there is a tree outside could be justified by an 
experience with the demonstrative content that the scene outside the 
window looks like this, and an inference reliant on additional information 
about what trees look like when seen through slight fog. In Elmer’s case, 
this response claims that only the clearest experience has tree content of the 
kind that can be directly taken up in belief. There is a shift in the 
operationally relevant experiential contents as soon as any amount of fog 
accrues. 
In effect, this response admits two distinct kinds of justification 
relation – one that is direct, and one that is degreed. Since the kind of 
justification that comes in degrees is not direct, the visual states that 
provide direct justification need not also be capable of reflecting shifts in 
degree of justification. As a consequence, some external world beliefs are 
directly justified by visual experience, but only very few. Couched in terms 
of credences, this approach translates to the claim that the clearest 
experiences directly justify credence one. Other lower-level credences are 
arrived at inferentially.  
The kind of inferential story offered in this response plausibly 
captures what is happening towards the foggier, Et∞ end of the spectrum. 
But anyone with an investment in DVJ (ExW) should hesitate before 
restricting the reach of direct justification to only the clearest cases, or the 
highest credence. The first reason is that doing so would amount to 
limiting it to so tiny a set of cases that it circumscribes the epistemic role it 
can play. We have optimally clear experiences very rarely, if ever. We 
almost always see objects under conditions that are suboptimal, however 
marginally, on some axis or other: distance, lighting, weather, occluders or 
our own eye-sight. If all these shifts in phenomenology are incompatible 
with direct justification, then direct justification is largely redundant in 
explaining how our visual beliefs are formed and justified. Equally, as we 
saw above there is good reason to think we rarely, if ever, have credence 
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one in a visual belief. If only those beliefs in which we have credence one 
are justified directly, then the reach of direct justification is very limited.  
A second reason to hesitate before restricting direct justification to 
only the clearest experiences is that doing so fails to capture the gradual 
shift in phenomenology taking place in these cases. On this view, the very 
slight shift in degree of justification between Et1 and Et2 corresponds to a 
shift in the operationally relevant contents, from tree contents, to 
appearance properties and background information. And yet the 
phenomenal differences between Et1 and Et2 are so slight that it seems 
implausible that the justification Et1 offers for belief is of a different form, 
and in virtue of a different set of contents than the justification Et1 can offer. 
Given how small the phenomenal shift is between Et1 and Et2, if Et1 includes 
tree content, so should Et2.  Of course we cannot reiterate that step 
indefinitely, but at this stage we are concerned with the smallest shift in 
phenomenal character that has an impact on the degree of justification. 
And that shift seems so small that if an experience on one side of it can 
directly justify a tree belief, so can an experience on the other. But if only 
the very clearest of experiences provide direct justification then there is a 
step-change in the nature of the justification provided by Et1 and Et2. That is 
because, on this view, the first time we have a change in degree of 
justification, we have a shift from an experience with tree content, to an 
experience on the basis of which Elmer can infer he’s looking at a tree.  
 
iii. Low-level contents 
Another possible response to these cases is to observe that the tension they 
generate relies on the contested claim that visual experiences include high-
level contents, contents like trees, and cats. In giving up high-level 
contents, we give up the claim that the operationally relevant contents 
remain stable across epistemically relevant shifts in character. If low-level 
contents shift more closely in line with character, and if low-level contents 
are responsible for the direct justification of belief, then that direct 
justification too will respond to changes in the character of experience. On 
this view, the density of relevant low-level contents determines the 
strength of the inference from low-level contents to high-level contents, 
and hence the degree of justification the subject enjoys for beliefs about 
those higher-level contents. If I have only sparse low-level content 
consistent with a tree, then my inference to a tree is less well supported 
than when there is a higher concentration of tree-consistent contents. 
Could we avoid cases like those of Rey and Elmer by allowing that direct 
justification is properly restricted to beliefs about more basic contents, such 
as color, size or location properties?  
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Accepting that visual experience represents only a more limited 
range of properties will limit the reach of these sorts of problem cases, but 
only so far as it sets corresponding limits on the range of external world 
propositions our experience can offer direct justification for. If visual 
experience represents a more limited set of experiences, then the range of 
possible cases of the kind described above is similarly restricted. The more 
interesting question is whether restricting visual contents in this way lets 
us avoid these sorts of cases altogether.  
 Merely retreating from high-level contents will not be enough to 
avoid these cases altogether. Shape, depth, color and location properties 
are generally treated as low-level properties, which are uncontroversially 
represented in perceptual experience. 23 But even if we limit ourselves to 
those properties we can generate cases in which an individual intuitively 
has some limited degree of direct justification for belief about those 
properties.  
Take Rey’s experience. Without assuming high-level contents, or 
even that her experience represents the object in question as a box, we can 
still ask at what point her experience represents the shape or location of the 
box. At Etn, when she has fully turned towards the object, she plausibly has 
direct justification for the beliefs that the object has a particular shape and 
location. At Etn-1 her visual experience of the object is just marginally less 
clear. If the degree of justification she enjoys for belief is to track her 
developing phenomenology, then she should enjoy just slightly less 
justification for that same beliefs about the object’s shape. But what 
explains that restriction? If the experience already represents the object’s 
shape at this point, then it can directly justify her belief. And it is plausible 
that the experience does represent its shape. After all, it doesn’t seem that 
Rey’s experience Etn-1 fails to represent shape, nor that it represents it as 
having a different, inaccurate shape. So that feature of the experiential 
content remains the same between Etn and Etn-1, and it is that content which 
is operationally relevant in this case. But then that content fails to reflect 
the epistemically relevant change in the phenomenal character of the 
experience between these times. 
I leave it open whether there may be some visual contents so basic 
that it seems inconceivable that our experience could justify anything less 
than full belief in them. Perhaps certain color properties could have that 
form, for instance. Allowing that possibility should not stop us recognizing 
that these problem cases can arise for other low-level properties.  																																																								23Prinz, for instance writes that “Just about everyone would agree that normally 
developing people can see certain spatial properties that are present in the 




iv. Other changes in perceptual contents 
A related response to these cases explains the shift in degree of justification 
on the basis of other changes in the contents of the experience, beyond the 
presence or absence of tree content. It’s natural to offer the accumulating 
fog a role in determining the epistemic profile of the experience, or changes 
in the luminance and sharpness in the appearance of the tree that that leads 
to.  
The tension described above does not demand that these changes 
are not epistemically significant. It only relies on the continuing epistemic 
significance of tree content, even as fog accrues. The phenomenal changes 
induced by the gathering fog are compatible with the experience 
continuing to have tree content, and with that content continuing to play a 
role in determining the epistemic capacities of the experience. The point is 
that trees can look a lot of different ways, whilst still looking like trees. 
They can be seen through rain and fog, at a distance or from an angle. Tree 
content is robust enough to withstand these kinds of variations. That tree 
content allows the experience to directly justify belief. We need an account 
then of how the epistemic impact of that tree content is non-inferentially 
impacted by the gathering fog.  
 
v. Indeterminate visual states 
 
By contrast with the options discussed above, what we want is to allow 
that some set of Elmer’s experiences can provide direct justification for the 
belief that there is a tree outside, but that the experiences in that set need 
not all provide the same degree of justification for that belief. That variation 
in degree of justification reflects differences in the phenomenology of the 
two experiences. Put in terms of credences, the cases above elicit the 
response that a credence of less than one may be directly justified by a 
visual experience. The challenge is to explain what fixes the credence the 
experience is capable of directly justifying, and why some visual states 
justify higher credences in their contents than other visual states.  
The problem we are confronted with is as follows: degree of 
justification can diminish gradually. That gradual change in perceptual 
justification reflects the gradual change in the phenomenal character of 
Elmer’s experience. But so long as we treat tree content or location-content 
as all-or-nothing, we cannot capture that gradual shift, because direct 
justification via the endorsement of that content is all-or-nothing. So at 
some point there is a sudden shift in the kind of justification Elmer or Rey 
enjoys, from direct to inferential. The abruptness of that shift fails to reflect 
the changing nuance of their phenomenal experience. A satisfactory 
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perceptual epistemology would allow the gradual change in phenomenal 
character of the experience to be mirrored by gradual changes in its 
epistemic capacities. But how can those epistemic capacities undergo a 
gradual transformation if they are rooted in the endorsement of binary 
perceptual states?  
We are faced with a mismatch between epistemic capacities that 
supervene on all-or-nothing contents of visual states, and the gradually 
changing phenomenal character of visual experiences over time. In this 
way, the tension identified above stems from the assumption that a visual 
state either has a particular content or it lacks it. One way of resolving the 
tension identified above whilst preserving DVJ (ExW) is to give up on that 
assumption.  
We could do this by simply describing the relevant contents as 
simply indeterminate. When Elmer sees a tree in fog, his experience has a 
content that is neither determinately a tree, nor determinately not-a-tree. In 
virtue of this his tree belief is less justified than when his visual state 
includes determinate tree content.  
Simply describing the contents of his experience as indeterminate 
does not on its own give us the epistemic resources we need. An 
indeterminate experience plausibly offers weaker justification for belief 
than a determinate experience. We don’t just want to recognize two levels 
of justification, however, but a host of incremental distinctions. In Elmer’s 
case, we need to account for a smooth positive correlation between the 
dissipating fog and the degree of justification. Degrees of justification seem 
to require degrees of determinacy.  
What does it mean for visual states to come with degrees of 
determinacy? One natural way of understanding this is to think of visual 
states as probabilistic. They don’t simply represent an object as a tree, but 
as more or less likely to be a tree. As I argue below, this approach loosens 
up the puzzles presented above, and lets us offer a simple account of 
immediate justification of degreed belief states, or of different degrees of 
justification for outright belief. This allows us to respect the desideratum 
that our visual justification reflect the nuance of our visual 
phenomenology, whilst also allowing that we have different degrees of 
justification for different visual beliefs, or that different experiences justify 
different degrees of belief in their contents. We can do this in a way that 
protects the claim that visual beliefs may be directly, and even immediately 
justified in some instances.  
 
4. Visual confidences 
Visual states could be probabilistic either in virtue of having probabilistic 
contents or in virtue of containing a probabilistic relation to their contents. 
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In what follows, I take the latter avenue, allowing that visual states include 
something like the perceptual analogue of credence for belief. 24 A credence 
is an attitude a subject takes towards a particular content. In that sense it is 
a relation to contents, not part of the contents. Visual states too could 
include a confidence relation to their contents, in the manner of a 
probability operator. On this view, a visual state is made up of visual 
contents together with a set of confidence relations to that content. This 
allows that more or less determinate experiences can include the same 
contents as one another. What varies is the confidence relation they bear to 
that contents. I will call these degreed relations “visual confidences”. The 
higher the degree of confidence, the higher the determinacy of the visual 
state.  
 On this view our visual experience does not just represent objects 
and properties, it also assigns degrees of confidence to those 
representations. Imagine walking along a beach towards an object in the 
distance, as it becomes gradually apparent to you that it is a turtle. As you 
advance along the beach your visual experience changes. Part of what 
changes is the confidence associated with the turtle contents. That 
confidence increases as you approach the turtle. That confidence relation is 
part of your visual experience. 
A single visual experience includes states with a range of 
confidence levels. A tree in the foreground will be represented with a 
higher degree of confidence than one in the distance, or at the periphery of 
your visual field. It is not just that object-identification is subject to 
differing degrees of confidence. A visual experience can present the 
particular colors or shapes or locations of objects with differing degrees of 
confidence.  
Differences in confidences are phenomenally detectable: a turtle 
represented with a high degree of confidence looks different to a turtle 
represented with a low degree of confidence. Recounting your experience 
on the beach, you might say “as I drew closer I could see it was probably a 
turtle washed up on the beach.” Visual confidences allow that you really 
did see that it was probably a turtle. This talk reflects the fact that visual 
contents can come with more or less confidence assigned to them. In this 
way, visual confidences provide a powerful tool to describe some of the 
otherwise hard-to-capture distinctions in the contents of our visual 
experiences.  																																																								
24In this respect my account aligns more closely with that of Morrison, (who talks 
of experiences assigning confidences to particular contents (forthcoming)) than 
with Moss (who talks in terms of visual experiences having probabilistic contents 
(ms).), though Morrison also considers the possibility of including degrees of 
confidence in the propositional content (forthcoming: 31f.).  
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In this way, confidences can allow that there are changes in the 
phenomenal character of an experience which are not reflected in a change 
in content per se. Some shifts in character can instead track changes in the 
confidence associated with those contents. This introduces an important 
degree of freedom. 
 
How do confidences apply to the cases of Elmer and Rey described above? 
Take Elmer’s visual experience of a tree. There is some content common to 
his experience of a tree in moderate fog and his experience of a tree in 
minimal fog. They both represent a tree. But something varies across those 
experiences, in addition to the presence of fog. The gathering fog has an 
impact on how the tree itself is presented. As the fog gathers, the tree is 
represented with less confidence.  
Consider the experience of Rey as she turns her head. What changes 
as she does so? The contents of her experience develop as what falls within 
her visual field changes, and the box moves from the periphery to the 
center of her visual field. At some point her experience unambiguously 
represents a grey object. When does that content appear? If we suppose 
that visual contents is all or nothing, its emergence represents an abrupt 
change in the contents of her experience. Allowing that visual states 
include a confidence relation lets us tell a different story. At some point her 
visual state includes a grey object among its contents, but that content is 
initially associated with a very low confidence. Part of what changes as she 
turns her head is the confidence with which the object is represented. The 
contents itself remains stable, but that changing confidence tracks the 
phenomenology of the experience as it develops over time.  
Why have confidences been overlooked in work on perceptual 
content to date, even as work on belief has embraced them? One source of 
resistance may be the sense that I limit my confidence in response to 
information. Hence it is natural to think of belief in terms of varying 
degrees of confidence, because belief is a response to information. Visual 
information on the other hand has traditionally been seen as information, 
the information in response to which one might form a more or less 
confident belief.25  
One way of assuaging this worry is to notice that visual experience 
is itself a response to information, even as it serves us in turn as a source of 
information about the external world. Visual experience is a response to 
uncertain retinal information. Retinal data fails to offer a determinate 
representation of the world. That feature of visual experience is 
foregrounded in probabilistic models of perception which have gained 																																																								
25 I am indebted to Susanna Siegel for discussion of this point.  
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ground recently in both philosophy and vision science.26 These models 
come in a range of flavors, but for our current purposes what matters is 
their agreement that visual experience represents a best guess on the part of 
the visual system, a kind of prediction of our external environment, 
informed and corrected by sparse retinal input which is incapable on its 
own of delivering a determinate representation of the distal stimuli that 
generate the experience in question. According to these models, our visual 
experience is merely the most likely interpretation of incoming retinal data 
in light of prior probability distributions. In effect, our visual experience 
represents some portion of the probability distribution.27 The claim made 
by these models that visual experience is merely probabilistic fits naturally 
with the claim that the contents of our visual experience are not limited to 
brute objects and properties but include associated degrees of confidence, 
confidences which reflect the probability that this particular representation 
gets it right.  
We should not be too quick in making the leap from probabilistic 
models of the processes responsible for visual experience to the claim that 
the content of those experiences is associated with confidence levels. We 
should not pretend, for instance, that visual confidences allow us to say 
that visual states simply directly reflect the probability distribution 
generated by the visual system. It is not as though we can read off the 
information contained in that distribution from our experiences, nor even 
the fact that it involves a probability distribution over competing 
hypotheses at all, (or vision science might have arrived rather more quickly 
at these sorts of probabilistic models). Given that visual confidences are in 
part motivated by the desire to capture more accurately the subtleties of 
our visual experience, we cannot then claim that they include content so 
wholly alien to our visual phenomenology as an entire probability 
distribution. The point, rather, is that the visual system already deals in 
probabilities and graded confidences. Given that it is commonplace to 
think that the belief system does too, it becomes increasingly strained to 
think of visual experience as a binary mediator between the two of them, 																																																								
26 For accounts of this kind see Andy Clarke (2013), Jakob Hohwy (2013), Vetter 
and Newen (2014), James Feldman (2014) or Friston (2012). 
27 According to Bayesian models of perception, visual perception produces as its 
output a set of probabilities distributed over competing hypotheses about the 
arrangement of the external world. As James Feldman (2014) observes, Bayesian 
models themselves provide no particular mandate for which part of that 
information visual experience should itself represent. That selection depends on 
the “loss function” an agent adopts. The maximum a posterior value, that is the 
peak of the probability distribution, will be selected when the loss function is zero-
one, when “all incorrect responses are equally penalized and correct responses are 
not penalized at all” (Feldman 2014:17).  
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talking, in effect, a different sort of language, in particular when doing so 
fails in addition to capture the nature of that experience.  
In what follows I am concerned to explore how visual confidences 
play a role in belief-formation and justification. I will argue that visual 
confidences could play a normative justificatory role, by moderating the 
degree of justification I have for a visual belief. Put in terms of credences, 
they moderate the credence I am entitled to have in my visual beliefs. 
 
5. Visual confidences and direct justification 
I have suggested that visual confidences let us capture subtleties in how 
objects appear to us, and to Elmer and Rey in the cases above. I turn now to 
offering a more detailed account of how visual confidences could 
contribute to a simple and convincing story of how visual experiences can 
directly justify belief states. What that account looks like depends on 
whether we take the beliefs in question to be full beliefs, or credences. Let’s 
assume in the first instance that those beliefs are full beliefs. How is it that 
visual experience can offer different degrees of direct justification to binary 
visual beliefs? 
Suppose that visual contents take the form of structured 
propositions, such that a visual experience of a bear consists of a property-
object pair of the form <x, Bear> that attributes the property of being a bear 
to an object that features in the visual experience. Plenty will disagree with 
this supposition, but it at least allows us to set out in more depth a sample 
account of how visual confidences justify belief, which can then be adapted 
to one’s favored model of perceptual contents. How does a confidence 
level come into this picture? A confidence level attaches to the attribution 
of the property to the object, that is, to the pair we already have. When I 
see a bear right in front of me, my visual experience has the contents <x, 
Bear>, and I bear a relation of, say, .98 confidence to that content. When I 
see a bear in the distance, my visual experience might involve a relation of 
.55 confidence to the contents <x, Bear>.  
Visual confidences offer powerful epistemic resources, because they 
allow that an experience can include a particular contents without that 
implying that one should have high credence in the corresponding 
perceptual belief. The puzzles of Elmer and Rey above start from the 
observation that perceptual beliefs can be justified to a range of degrees. I 
may form the same belief, “that’s a bear!” whether I see a bear close up or 
in the distance. But those beliefs enjoy differing degrees of justification: 
when I see the animal in the distance then the corresponding belief enjoys a 
weaker level of justification than when I get a good look at it up close. 
Visual confidences are well placed to explain this variation. They let us tie 
that difference in the degree of justification enjoyed by different perceptual 
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beliefs to variation in the perceptual states that ground them. The contents 
of my visual experiences entitle me to form certain beliefs on their basis. 
The confidence with which those contents are presented moderates the 
degree of justification the associated beliefs enjoy. The distant bear 
experience associates the contents <x, Bear> with a confidence of .55 and 
the associated visual belief is justified to a weaker degree than the belief 
associated with the close-up bear experience, when the content <x, Bear> is 
associated with a confidence of .98. The confidence relation explains how 
justification can continue to be immediate, whilst also coming in different 
degrees. Your belief uptakes the content of the visual experience, severed 
from its confidence relation. The degree of justification is determined by 
the confidence level. There is no need for any intervening inference 
between experience and belief on this picture.  
On this picture, visual states are like weather forecasts that predict 
rain with a certain degree of confidence. If the weather forecast tells you 
there’s a 50% chance of rain tomorrow, that offers only moderate 
justification for the belief that it will rain tomorrow. Visual confidences 
allow that visual perceptual states mediate the justification of beliefs based 
upon them in a similar way. The confidence with which contents are 
represented determines the justification I have for the belief in question, 
just as the confidence with which rain is forecast determines the 
justification I have for the belief that it will rain tomorrow.  
A visual confidence is in effect an estimate of the likely accuracy of 
the associated contents. If the visual system is well-calibrated, then the 
visual contents it associates with a .9 confidence will be accurate 90% of the 
time, whereas the contents associated with a .2 confidence will be accurate 
only 20% of the time. Those confidences amount to a representation of the 
likely accuracy of the associated contents. In virtue of that the first belief is 
more strongly justified than the latter. 
Visual confidences give us the resources to describe the changing 
epistemic position of Elmer and Rey. The different experiences available to 
Elmer include states that represent trees with varying degrees of 
confidence. If Elmer goes to the window soon, his experience will represent 
a tree with a high degree of confidence. That confidence gradually drops 
away and at some point his experience no longer includes Tree content. But 
that is not an abrupt cut off. Just as the confidence associated with the Tree 
content gradually declines, so does the degree of justification those states 
would confer on Elmer’s tree beliefs. The experiences can still directly 
justify tree beliefs. The justification is still in virtue of the relationship 
between the contents of the experiential state and the contents of the belief 
state. But the lower confidence with which the content is presented limits 
the degree of justification. In this way, visual confidences allow direct 
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justification to mirror subtle and gradual shifts in the phenomenal 
character of our experiences.  
We can tell a similar story about Rey: as she turns towards the box, 
the confidence associated with the visual states that represent it increases. 
They need not do so at the same pace: perhaps the experience clearly 
represents the color sooner than it does the size of the object. The 
confidence associated with each state determines the degree of justification 
of that aspect of her visual belief. The justification relation is still grounded 
in the experiential contents, but the relation is sensitive to the confidence 
with which the visual contents are presented. Visual confidences let us give 
an account of direct justification by visual experience that respects the 
desideratum on perceptual justification described in section one: they let us 
tell a story about justification that is responsive to differences in the nuance 
of how objects appear to us. 
Accounting for these nuances in phenomenal character in terms of 
visual confidences need not overlook the significance of other changes in 
content, e.g. the accumulation of fog, or the changes in luminance and 
sharpness in the appearance of the tree that that leads to. Those other 
changes in content are not independent from the shifting confidence with 
which the tree is presented. It’s the gathering fog and the decreasing 
luminance, for instance, which are responsible for the diminishing 
confidence you have in the tree content. But those features aren’t 
incompatible with your experience continuing to have tree content or color 
and size content, nor with that content continuing to offer a form of direct 
justification for belief. 
Visual confidences also allow that full beliefs about probabilities can 
be directly justified by visual experience. Visual contents associated with a 
lower degree of confidence justify the corresponding probabilistic belief: 
the contents <x, bear> associated with .65 confidence justifies the belief that 
the object is probably a bear. Associated with a .35 confidence it could 
justify the belief that the object is possibly a bear. Both experiences still 
offer some support for full belief that the object is a bear, but to a more 
limited degree. Note that on this view there is no single belief that a visual 
experience offers direct justification for. It can justify a range of beliefs to 
different degrees depending on the strength of those beliefs. A belief that 
an object is possibly a bear is strongly justified by a visual state associated 
with a lower confidence, whereas the belief that the object is a bear would 
receive a weak degree of justification from the same state.  
 
Degrees of belief 
Part of the epistemic motivation we described for visual confidences came 
from the difficulty of accounting for the interface between binary 
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experiential states and degreed belief. Our discussion since then has 
focused on the question of how visual states that include confidences can 
justify full beliefs. What if belief comes in degrees? How do degreed visual 
states justify belief in that case?  
Visual confidences offer a simple solution to the problem of how 
visual experiences interface with graded belief states. Visual states with 
confidences are themselves graded. They can therefore interface directly 
with graded belief states. There is no mystery around what credence a 
given experience licenses in its contents. It offers prima facie justification for 
the credence which corresponds to the confidence relations associated with 
the relevant content. There is no need for beliefs about the experience to 
mediate the justification the experience offers belief. Visual confidences fix 
the credence the believer is entitled to have in the corresponding belief.  
Take the case of Elmer. If he goes to the window soon, he will be 
able to see the tree outside clearly. That experience entitles him to have a 
high credence in the belief that there’s a tree outside. If he waits a little 
longer, his foggier experience will entitle him to have only a moderate 
credence in that belief. Why? Both experiences have tree content. But that 
content is presented with different degrees of confidence. When it is 
presented with a high degree of confidence, that entitles Elmer to have a 
correspondingly high credence in the corresponding belief. When it is 
presented with a moderate confidence, that entitles him to have the same 
middling degree of belief in its contents.  
We can draw again on the analogy with a weather forecast. If the 
weather forecast tells you there’s a 50% chance of rain tomorrow, that 
licenses a .5 credence in the proposition it will rain tomorrow. The 
confidence with which contents are represented determines the credence 
with which I am entitled to hold the belief in question, similarly to the way 
in which the confidence with which rain is forecast determines the 
credence I am entitled to have that it will rain tomorrow. It is appropriate 
for Elmer to have a higher credence in the clear experience contents than 
the foggy experience contents: the higher confidence associated with the 
former represents a higher likelihood that they are accurate, (provided the 
system is reasonably well-calibrated). As a consequence, those different 
credences constitute an appropriate response to the evidence provided by 
those visual states. 
 Both high and low credences can be equally justified, in virtue of 
their correspondence with the relevant visual confidence.28 What if the 																																																								
28 By forming credences that are in line with well-calibrated visual confidences an 
individual will in effect be conforming to a version of David Lewis’ (1980) 
Principal Principle, according to which a rational agent conforms their subjective 
credences to the objective chances.  
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agent fails to conform their credence to the confidence of their experience? 
In that case we can evaluate the degree of justification that the credence 
they do form enjoys. The further it departs from the credence that is 
warranted by the experience, the weaker its justification.  
I have claimed that visual experiences justify credences that 
correspond to the confidence associated with their content. But there are 
times when this claim seems obviously implausible. Consider cases of 
visual illusion, for instance. The apparent bend in the stick as it enters the 
water, or the lines of the Muller-Lyer illusion might be presented with a 
very high degree of confidence, even after I know that I am subject to a 
visual illusion. It seems obviously wrong to claim I continue to receive the 
same degree of justification for the belief that the stick is bent or the lines 
different lengths to one another. 
 In these cases, we can recognize that you continue to receive the 
same degree of prima facie justification from your visual experience for the 
belief that the stick is bent. But that does not mean that that belief is ultima 
facie justified. In these cases of visual illusion there is a defeater for the 
prima facie justification – your awareness that your visual experience is 
misrepresenting certain aspects of your environment. 
 The account presented here describes the justification visual states 
provide for belief in the absence of defeaters or other relevant background 
features. It describes only the simplest way in which visual states can 
justify belief states. Very often the epistemic impact of an experience 
depends not just on the visual states that comprise it, but on prior 
information that lets the agent update appropriately on the basis of that 
novel experience. That information may be cognitive, or it may consist of 
other visual experiences, and the way such experiences develop dynamic 
relations with one another over time.  
 
6. Comparative and disjunctive beliefs 
It is significant that once we grant that visual states include a range of 
contents associated with confidence levels, it is no longer the case that a 
visual state justifies a unique belief state in virtue of its contents. This has 
some important upshots for the resulting picture of direct visual 
justification.  
This feature of the account has the result that a single visual 
experience may directly justify inconsistent propositions. Consider the 
cases offered in Silins (2011) of a visual experience of a card with dots on it, 
that is flashed before you. On the basis of your visual experience you 
cannot be sure if the card has ten or eleven dots on it. Nonetheless your 
experience gives you justification to raise your credence in both those 
propositions. As a consequence, “you gain immediate justification to 
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increase your credence in multiple propositions which cannot all be true.” 
Silins uses these cases to argue against the content constraint, noting that 
“[s]o long as the content of these experiences remains consistent, the 
propositions justified by the experience will outrun their content” [2011: 
346].  
 Once we allow confidences into the picture we can explain these 
cases in the following way. Your visual experience of the card includes 
both ten-dot and eleven-dot content. Each of those contents is associated 
with a low degree of confidence. Supposing that those confidences are 
higher than your existing credences that the card has ten dots or that it has 
eleven dots, then your experience justifies you in raising your credences in 
both propositions in response to it. That increase in credence in conflicting 
propositions is an appropriate response to the content of the experience. As 
a result, once we allow that a visual state includes a range of contents 
associated with distinct degrees of confidence, these cases no longer 
provide a counter example to the content constraint. You may have direct 
justification to raise your credence in multiple inconsistent propositions on 
the basis of a single visual experience, when your experience includes a 
range of potentially inconsistent contents with different degrees of 
confidence. 
 Visual confidences also allow us to describe what happens when 
you see a card fleetingly with a slightly higher or lower number of dots. 
The character of your experience changes in some way as the number of 
dots changes. That change in character can be accounted for in two ways. 
On the one hand, it could be due to a shift in the propositions over which 
your experience distributes in confidences. When the card in fact has ten 
dots then perhaps your confidence is distributed over propositions that 
range between eight and twelve dots. When the card in fact has eleven dots 
then it is plausible that that range shifts slightly higher, to, say, between 9 
and 13 dots. Alternatively, that change in character could be accounted for 
by a change in the confidence relation your visual experience bears to the 
same set of propositions. The phenomenology of an experience will reflect 
the shape and peak of the probability distribution as well as its boundaries.  
 Visual confidences also allow that visual experiences can offer 
direct justification for comparative or disjunctive beliefs, for instance that 
an object is either blue or purple, or is more likely blue than purple. Both 
Silins (2011:350) and Pautz (2011:397) doubt that visual experiences could 
have comparative content of a sort that could directly justify such beliefs. 
But suppose you have a visual state which represents an object as blue 
with .6 confidence and as purple with .3 confidence. If one simply 
endorsed that experience in belief, one would have direct justification for a 
higher credence that the object is blue than that it is purple. This is 
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equivalent to the experiential state offering direct justification for the 
comparative belief that the object is more likely blue than purple. Suppose 
you have a visual experience with confidence distributed evenly over two 
competing possibility, for instance, that an object is a dog or that it is a 
goat. Your experience in effect offers direct justification for the disjunctive 
belief that the object is either a dog or a goat. Visual confidences have the 
result that a single visual experience justifies complex beliefs directly, in 
virtue of its contents and the confidence relations we bear to them.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Visual confidences offer a range of powerful resources to help us make 
sense of the epistemic relationship between visual states and belief states. 
They let us offer an account of how the former come to inform and justify 
the latter. This account can allow both that direct justification can come in 
degrees, and that credal states can be immediately justified by visual 
experience. Visual confidences thereby allow us to capture the way in 
which variations in our visual phenomenology result in subtle variations in 
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